

WASHINGTON POST

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Senate Votes Curb on Pay To Viet Allies

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate plunged into a new debate yesterday on proposals to restrict U.S. financing for what critics call "foreign mercenaries" fighting in Indochina.

By voice vote, senators approved an amendment forbidding U.S. payments of special Vietnam allowances for Thai, South Korean or any other troops in excess of the combat pay levels being received by U.S. soldiers.

Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) said a subcommittee headed by Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) had, with extreme difficulty, extracted statistics from the administration.

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They revealed that a Thai lieutenant general fighting in South Vietnam would receive \$5,400 a year in U.S.-financed special combat pay, while an American officer of equivalent rank got only \$780 extra.

Fulbright said the American people, unaware for years of the secret agreements with Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea "were continually told by their leaders" that in Vietnam represented recognition that all Asian nations had a stake in Vietnam. That stake, it now turns out, was in good part money.

Fulbright also called up a second and much farther reaching "anti-mercenary" amendment to the \$19.3-billion defense procurement bill. It would prohibit U.S. financing of Vietnamese or Thai military operations on behalf of either the Cambodian or Laotian governments. A vote on it may come today.

Fulbright said its purpose was to make sure that the U.S., without congressional assent, does not begin financing Vietnamese or Thai military adventures that could escalate the war in Laos, risk provoking Red China into intervention there or involve the U.S. in aid to South Vietnamese forces—"in propping up the Lon Nol government" in Cambodia "through third parties."

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report on the procurement bill, had included a paragraph attempting to make clear that funds should not be used to finance South Vietnamese intervention on behalf of the Cambodian government.

But Fulbright said this should be made applicable to both Thai and South Vietnamese troops and broadened to include intervention on behalf of Laos.

The excess pay amendment was accepted by Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.), who said he would be glad to take it to a House-Senate confer-

ence but ~~did not feel~~ he could insist on its application to existing agreements with foreign nations. He said, however, he would ask for its application to future payment agreements and would also seek full reports from the administration on details of agreements.

Earlier yesterday, the Senate debated for hours an administration-opposed amendment by Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.) and Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) to experiment with the concept of an all-volunteer army. Hatfield said the amendment would raise military pay now and thus allow the Pentagon to determine — a year before the current draft law runs out — whether added inducements would make it possible to depend on volunteers only.

Objecting, Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) said college students, in the current war-time situation, would simply not volunteer and "we're going to have the poor people of this country end up being the volunteers" to "fight rich men's wars." Stennis predicted the war "will continue for some time under the policy of the President" and volunteers would not fill manpower needs.

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SENATE ASKS CURB ON WAR PAY GOING TO VIETNAM ALLIES

Votes to Forbid Allowances
Higher Than Those Paid
American Soldiers

By ROBERT M. SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 — The Senate voted today to bar the United States from paying larger allowances to allied troops in Vietnam than it pays to American soldiers.

Special allowances have been given three countries—Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines—for troops that they sent to Vietnam. It was disclosed in testimony before a Senate subcommittee that the allowances granted to these troops exceeded the allowances paid to United States military personnel in Vietnam.

The allowance for G.I.'s, for example, was put at \$65 a month, but "twice that for Thai and South Korean troops," the committee was told.

The Senate, which has been caught up in wrangle after wrangle on amendments to the military procurement bill, took only 50 minutes to debate the proposal, offered by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas. The Senate then passed the amendment by unanimous voice vote.

The only Senator speaking against the proposal was Strom Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina. Mr. Thurmond urged that "nothing be done to cause these 69,000 troops from free world countries to be withdrawn."

Agnew to Visit 2 Recipients

Two of the three countries that received overseas or per diem allowances from the United States for the troops in Vietnam—Thailand and South Korea—are to be stops on Vice President Agnew's forthcoming trip to Asia.

In presenting his amendment, Senator Fulbright pointed out that a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee discovered in hearings last fall and winter that the United States was paying allowances to allied troops that were about double the allowances paid to its own servicemen.

State and Defense Department testimony before the subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad disclosed that while Thailand was paying its majors \$98 a month in base pay, the United States was paying them \$180 more in overseas allowances. Thailand was paying its privates \$26 a month; the United States was paying them \$39 more a month.

According to testimony at the hearings, the Philippines was paying its captains \$125 a month, and the United States was paying them \$150 more a month. The Philippines paid its master sergeants \$53 a month, and the United States was paying them \$76 a month.

Senator Fulbright also pointed out that each South Korean soldier leaving South Vietnam got 40 cubic feet of personal cargo space on the ship taking him home. The Koreans use the space, the Senator said, to take home American beer, C-rations, cigarettes and American electrical products.

"It is time," Senator Fulbright said, "to stop making mercenaries out of allies, and allies out of mercenaries. You should not pay overseas or combat pay to a foreign soldier more than to an American soldier."

Senator John Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, who heads the Armed Services Committee, agreed: "I'm impressed with it, and if some adjustment can be made consistent with our honor, I'd like to see it done."

Senator Stennis promised he would try to get the House of Representatives to go along with the provision in the joint conference committee that will have to try to work out an agreement between the two houses on the final military procurement bill.

But Senator Stennis made two admonitions: That the United States would have to observe any commitments it might have already made, and that some delicacy might be necessary since American forces are leaving Vietnam. As he put it, "We are withdrawing, and I don't feel we should go in there with a meat axe."

Goldwater Backs Amendment

Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, said he agreed with the amendment and asked whether it would be "improper to ask either the Department of State or the Department of Defense to make reports on what foreign troops are paid."

"You talk about getting reports," Senator Fulbright replied. "It took six months to get this one report" for the subcommittee last fall. The Senator noted, at another point, that "Congressional approval was neither sought nor given" for the allowances.

Senator Fulbright also said that the quarterly reports the Defense Department did submit to Congress grossly underestimated the actual outlays.

He said that a report done by the General Accounting office for the Foreign Relations Committee found that the United States had given the Philippines \$40.8-million from the fiscal year 1966 through the second quarter of 1970, while the Pentagon reported having provided only \$17.3-million.

Urging that the Senate not take hasty action against allies, Senator Thurmond said: "We induced them to help us. They are helping to bail us out."

This brought Senator Charles H. Percy to his feet. "We are there helping them," the Illinois Republican declared. "They are there protecting themselves. We are not in danger."

Senator Fulbright said several times that the allied troops were not in Vietnam to fight but were only there for their propaganda value.

"The Filipinos didn't do an iota of fighting," he charged. "We paid them very well to go down there and sit on their behinds."

In regard to the Thais, he quoted what he said was the remark of an American soldier: "The only way you can get the Thais to fight is to put a PX between them and the VC."

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should we fail to continue to hope and pray that freedom will be restored to Czechoslovakia and the other nations subject to Soviet domination.

A TRIBUTE TO THE PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, on this August 21 it is fitting that we pause and pay tribute to the people of Czechoslovakia; for it was 2 years ago today that the Soviet-led forces of the Warsaw Pact occupied Czechoslovakia and proceeded to bring to an end the Czechoslovakia experiment in liberalization.

Much has been written about this latest tragedy for Czechoslovakia. Carefully recorded in the press, in periodical literature, and in books are the developments of these past 2 years during which the Soviets have succeeded in undoing the work of the reformers and returning the country to its former path of rigid orthodoxy. Symbolically, this task was completed by Prague's acceptance of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" as formulated within the recently concluded Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.

An important point about the events prior to the Soviet intervention was the dramatic manifestation of the Czechoslovak desire for freedom. The pressure for reform came from below, from the people, and was translated into political action ironically by a Communist leadership that itself could not escape its awesome influence.

What was taking place during the few months prior to the intervention was the resurgence of the irrepressible spirit of freedom that is deeply rooted in the peoples of Czechoslovakia.

On this anniversary, therefore, let us turn our thoughts to the people of Czechoslovakia and once more dedicate ourselves to the proposition that one day they will regain their freedom.

FLIGHT SERVICE STATIONS OBSERVE GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY—AIR TRAFFIC SPECIALISTS PROVIDE VITAL SAFETY EFFORT

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, this week marks the golden anniversary of flight service stations, a far-reaching network of 340 facilities operated by the Federal Aviation Administration to provide a wide range of aeronautical services.

Originally established by the Post Office on August 20, 1920, to support the early airmail service, these facilities have phased from bonfires to beacons to broadcasts. From wireless to computers they have bridged civil aviation's communications and navigations gap—from the primitive "spark" and "arc" transmitting devices to solid state and remote control equipment.

The original string of 17 airway radio stations, for the most part, stretched over desolate wilderness and high mountain passes. Some stations were accessible only by mule train; others by skis and sleds. The one room shacks were drab and drafty, generally manned by a lone operator who worked 7 days a week on a split shift. His communications equip-

ment was sketchy and primitive. Four of the original stations have been in continuous operation since 1920: Elko, Nev.; Rock Springs, Wyo.; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Washington, D.C.

Like the first airmail pilots and other pioneers of flight, the men and women who kept them flying—the ground support specialists, the airway radio operators—were equally intrigued by aviation. They had a mission and they provided a service. Their work began before dawn and it ended after dark. Quite literally, they laid the foundation for today's airway network.

The Federal Aviation Administration this week is commemorating the first 50 years of flight service stations, with a series of national events including open houses, radio and television programs, and other community festivities.

But amid the visitors and public attention, the quiet, resolute work of FAA's 4,600 air traffic specialists continues. Over the counter, over the phone, or over the radio flight service specialists are providing assistance around the clock to safeguard our Nation's pilots. Specialists offer thorough preflight briefings and weather forecasts; alert airborne pilots by radio of expected weather conditions and assist them in charting alternative courses; and broadcast information about special airport conditions and navigational aides that might be temporarily out of commission. And if a pilot runs low on fuel or gets lost, the calm, steady voice of the air traffic specialist is with him in the cockpit to guide him out of danger. Help is just the push of a microphone button away.

I congratulate FAA Administrator John H. Shaffer, and the employees of FAA, particularly the flight service station personnel, on this 50th anniversary of Flight Service Stations.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my congratulatory telegram to the West Virginia Flight service stations be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the telegram was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AUGUST 20, 1970.

To Mr. Clyde E. Brown, Chief, Federal Aviation Administration Flight Service Station, Wood County, Airport, Parkersburg, W. Va.; Mr. Louis C. Rech, Jr., Chief, Federal Aviation Administration Flight Service Station, Wheeling-Ohio County Airport, Wheeling, W. Va.; Mr. Richard Johnson, Chief, Federal Aviation Administration Flight Service Station, Mercer County Airport, Bluefield, W. Va.; Mr. Goodwin Glassman, Chief, Federal Aviation Administration Flight Station, Kanawha County Airport, Charleston, W. Va.; Mr. Maurice J. Genthon, Chief, Federal Aviation Administration Flight Service Station, Elkins-Randolph County Airport, Elkins, W. Va.; Mr. R. T. Underwood, Chief, Federal Aviation Administration Flight Service Station, Tri-State Airport, Huntington, W. Va.; Mr. James Coleman, Chief, Federal Aviation Administration Flight Service Station, Morgantown Municipal Airport, Morgantown, W. Va.; Mr. Brooke E. Ettinger, Chief, Federal Aviation Administration Flight Service Station, Martinsburg Airport, Martinsburg, W. Va.:

My congratulations and commendation

are extended to you and through you to personnel of your station on fiftieth anniversary of flight service stations. FSS activities are vital to the safe and efficient operation of our airport/airways system. Being a constant traveler in both commercial and private aircraft, I am keenly aware of your responsibilities and the outstanding performance and dedication of FSS personnel.

JENNINGS RANDOLPH,
U.S. Senator.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND REFORM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, this year, an event of fundamental significance has taken place: the National Assembly of South Vietnam has passed, and President Thieu has signed, what the New York Times has termed "the most ambitious and progressive non-Communist land reform program of the 20th century."

There can be no doubt that this action should have taken place long ago—I have been attempting to persuade the State Department on this point for many years. But there can also be no question that past failure to enact a land reform program in South Vietnam should not dissuade us from taking action to speed up implementation of the "Land to the Tiller Act," while land reform is possible and still important. The benefits of rapid implementation of land reform could be considerable, both in terms of American lives saved and in terms of the future stability of South Vietnam.

Land reform is not a simple issue; many people who would support it if they fully understood its significance are uncertain about many facets of the program. The questions that land reform poses can and should be answered, because understanding the importance of land reform is critical to understanding the nature of the forces at work in South Vietnam and in modernizing nations throughout the world.

My remarks today have this aim: to explain the significance of land reform in modernizing nations generally; to recapitulate briefly the history and prospects of land reform in South Vietnam particularly; to explain why land reform can and should be carried out there irrespective of the time table for American troop withdrawal; and to demonstrate that such reform is truly in the best and expressed interests of the people of South Vietnam, regardless of the government that is in power there at the present time and regardless of the nature of any government that may come to power in the future.

My earnest hope is that Senators and their staffs will take the time to review these remarks, and to see how land reform in South Vietnam is compatible with each of the many views about the war in South Vietnam held by members of this body. This is not a partisan issue, nor an issue that will divide supporters and opponents of the President's war policies—something that a glance at the list of supporters will indicate immediately. At the very least, the Senate should ponder the importance of land reform so that conflicts like that in Vietnam can be avoided or minimized in the future.

One member of my staff suggested that this speech should be entitled, "What You Always Wanted To Know About Land Reform, But Were Afraid To Ask." I wish that I could profess such complete knowledge of this highly complex subject. I cannot, however, and what follows is only a very brief and simplified description of land reform and its importance. I shall be happy to refer Senators or their staffs to a more complete list of studies upon request. I must mention and thank Prof. Roy Prosterman from the University of Washington who has helped me and many other Senators understand the importance of land reform as a concept and as a means of providing political and economic stability for many countries in the world, including South Vietnam.

1. THE CONCEPT OF LAND REFORM: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN MODERNIZING NATIONS GENERALLY

Whether we refer to the nations of the Third World as "modernizing," "emerging," or "developing," we can easily recognize that the types of change a nation experiences on the road from tradition to modernity are difficult ones that may cause tremendous political instability. The process of change involves the disruption of traditional institutions and relationships that provided continuity and stability in the past. It is during this transition phase from traditional institutions to more modern ones that a developing nation is most prone to violence, insurrection, and revolution.

In the urban sector of modernizing nations, important new political groups emerge during the process of modernization and make demands upon the government and the political system. These groups include a proletariat, industrialists, merchants and financiers, students, intellectuals and a military establishment. The competing demands and varying strengths of these urban groups frequently lead to urban unrest or rebellion, which in turn may lead to a succession in governments or ruling elites. Because most modernizing nations are predominantly rural, however, and because the impact of the central government on these rural areas is generally slight, such disruptions or rebellions rarely change the fundamental character of the nation. Governments can and do change without affecting the way of life that the great mass of the country's populace have followed for centuries. Because the countryside remains passive during the early stages of modernization, urban uprisings or unrest are seen as minor and unavoidable by most students of development.

It is in the countryside, not the city, that the future course of a modernizing nation is determined. Rural or agrarian disruption, unlike urban disruption, is avoidable—in a manner I will discuss shortly—but the relative dominance of the rural elements in a modernizing nation makes the impact of such disruption massive if it should occur.

The rural sector, like the urban sector, must undergo fundamental changes during modernization. Unlike the urban sector, however, the rural sector is characterized by only one traditional institution of major importance: the pattern

of landownership. In almost all traditional societies, the bulk of the land is owned by a small class of wealthy landlords, while the vast majority of those who actually till the soil do not own the land they work. As the modernizing influence spreads to the countryside, and as the desire for change accompanies it, it is this traditional landlord-tenant relationship that becomes the focus of peasant unrest and revolutionary efforts.

The peasant has a simple goal: to gain control of the land he tills. This simple redistributive aim of the peasant becomes a powerful force as the burden of rents, taxes and labor, and the uncertainty of tenure with which the tenant lives, become intolerable.

It is this universal objective of the peasantry, combined with its great numbers, that makes the peasant a most volatile and critical element. The peasant's allegiance will belong to the party that gives him his land; as Mao Tse-tung writes:

Who ever solves the land question will win the peasant.

The crucial question for a modernizing nation is whether the peasant is promised his land by the government or by those whose aim is to overthrow the government.

It is this battle for the allegiance of the rural population that distinguishes contemporary guerrilla warfare in modernizing nations from traditional warfare between two sovereign nations. Rather than being faced with a military threat from foreign troops, the governments of many modernizing nations find themselves facing what is primarily a political/military threat from native guerrillas. These guerrillas do not initially attack government troops—they are far too weak and far too few in number to dissipate their resources at this stage. Instead, the guerrillas seek to build a political base of support in the countryside, among the peasants who are increasingly dissatisfied with the central government and its failure to bring about agrarian reform. As one expert has written:

Current guerrilla warfare is the logical and planned result of building upon a foundation of peasant discontent over land tenure and the society shaped by it.

This antigovernment guerrilla warfare takes the form of convincing the peasantry that the revolutionaries, rather than the government, can best respond to the peasant's needs. One of these needs is the need for protection, and the terrorist activities of the guerrillas during the early years of the conflict—including the assassination of village headmen and even some peasants—are designed to demonstrate that the government cannot or will not defend the peasantry, and that it is useless for the peasant to look to the government for protection or control.

A less publicized, but much more significant, element of antigovernment warfare is the promise of the guerrillas to turn the land over to the peasants. This has been a central theme of every major revolution or revolutionary attempt in the 20th century. The revolutionaries promise, and often carry out

even during the conflict, land reform on a large scale. In contrast to the pledge and performance of the revolutionaries, the central government frequently uses its force to continue the hated institution of tenancy and the domination of the despised landowning classes.

Communist revolutionaries, from Lenin to Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro, have recognized the ability of the peasantry to be mobilized as a force for revolution through the land tenure issue. Lenin also recognized the ability of the central government to command the peasant's loyalty through land reform, and so undermine the revolution—that is why, in prerevolution days, he despaired of the revolution's success in the face of the redistributive Stolypin Reforms. Had Stolypin not been assassinated in 1911, the course of the Russian Revolution might have been a very different one.

Mao and Castro made effective use of the land reform issue to build a powerful base of support in the countryside, allowing the revolutionaries to receive supplies, information, and hiding when necessary. In Mexico and Bolivia, however, where land reform had been carried out by non-Communist revolutions, the immunity of the peasantry to Communist revolutionary fervor has been recognized by Communist and non-Communist leaders alike. Che Guevara himself bemoaned the conservative orientation of the Bolivian peasants, and attributed that orientation directly to the land reforms that had been carried out.

Mexico and Bolivia are the exceptions, however. In many other nations, the revolutionary forces have not only promised land reform, but have carried it out in the areas within their control. Unfortunately for the peasantry, however, the aftermath of successful Communist revolutions has always been the brutal and bloody collectivization of peasant-held agricultural lands. This was true in the Soviet Union, in China, in Cuba, in North Korea, and in North Vietnam. This collectivization process not only deprives the peasants of the land they held briefly, but invariably results in wholesale slaughter of those who resist. Nonetheless, because "few peasants are historians," the appeal of the revolutionary slogans guarantees substantial peasant support for anti-government forces, particularly where the government has failed to undertake a competitive land reform program of its own.

Nowhere has the appeal of land reform promised by the antigovernment forces been greater than in South Vietnam, where landownership is blatantly inequitable. The Vietcong, and the Vietminh before them, have actually given land over to the peasants in those provinces where they have control. Not only does this drastically reduce whatever incentive the peasantry may have had to support the government, but it has made possible a high level of recruitment for the Vietcong. As one American military official has written, the Vietcong recruitment effort is simple: "The movement gave you your land; now give us your son."

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Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070015-3

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A government faced with a revolutionary threat during the early stages of modernization is thus faced with a battle for the support and allegiance of the peasantry. The alternative to allowing the peasants to become revolutionaries is, in theory at least, a simple one: the government must carry out reforms that give the land to the peasants. By doing so, the government gives the peasants a stake in the defense of the country, and insures that they will be an antirevolutionary force. As Samuel P. Huntington, a distinguished student of developing nations and the past chairman of the Government Department at Harvard University has written:

The peasantry . . . may be the bulwark of the status quo of the shock troops of revolution. Which role the peasant plays is determined by the extent to which the existing system meets his immediate economic and material needs as he sees them. These needs normally focus on land tenure and tenancy, taxes, and prices. Where conditions of land-ownership are equitable and provide a viable living for the peasant, revolution is unlikely. Where they are inequitable and where the peasant lives in poverty and suffering, revolution is likely, if not inevitable, unless the government takes prompt measures to remedy these conditions. No social group is more conservative than a landowning peasantry, and none is more revolutionary than a peasantry which owns too little land or pays too high a rental. The stability of government in modernizing countries is thus, in some measure, dependent upon its ability to promote reform in the countryside.

II. OBSTACLES TO GOVERNMENT-INITIATED LAND FORM

As Huntington has written, in the absence of land reform, the peasants may be the key to revolution—or with land reform—the key to stability. Given the crucial “swing role” of the peasant, land reform is thus the most important non-military activity that a government of a modernizing nation can undertake. Why then is government-initiated land reform so rare a phenomenon in the 20th century?

The answer to this question is not that government leaders, as a group, have failed to perceive the importance of land reform—in fact, the opposite is true. But understanding the need for land reform and carrying it out are two separate issues. History is replete with examples of leaders who have tried valiantly to bring about land reform, but who have been unable to surmount the obstacles in the path of this reform and who have consequently been overthrown or deposed.

The reasons why governments fail to carry out land reform even when they understand its importance are both political and financial. In most traditional or transitional societies, the landowning classes are a powerful political force with substantial bases of support in the cabinet, the assembly, or the court. Land reform is impossible without the acquiescence—voluntary or compelled—of the landowning class. Compulsion is rarely possible, because of the landowning class' political strength, and “voluntary” acquiescence to land reform hinges on the government's ability to compensate the landlords for the lands to be distributed.

Persuasion of the landlords to accept land reform has thus been possible pri-

marily in those nations—notably the oil-producing nations of the Middle East—where the government has sufficient revenues to make land reform attractive to the landowners and peasants alike. Sometimes the recognition that the alternative to land reform is revolution, and that revolution means the confiscation of land without compensation, has made landlords more receptive to the government's program. As Prime Minister Amini told the landowners of Iran:

Divide your lands or face revolution—or die.

Land reform has traditionally foundered, therefore, when the government of the modernizing nation has been too weak to confiscate the land and too poor to pay for it. This has meant, unfortunately, that the two conditions under which land reform has been most successfully carried out are revolution and foreign occupation. Communist revolution has betrayed land reform in the end, as we have seen, although non-Communist revolutions such as those in Mexico and Bolivia have achieved more lasting results. Foreign occupation has produced results—in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan—for the simple reason that the occupying power is not committed to the landowning class and that an occupying power generally has the financial capability to carry out a land reform program of sweeping proportions.

Fortunately, however, a willingness to provide financial assistance can be just as effective as occupation, and a good deal less repugnant to both the foreign power and the country in which the reforms are to be carried out. The United States has recognized this periodically, as when we offered \$60 million to the government of Peru to implement land reform there.

Land reform assistance from the United States is a route that can and should be followed in South Vietnam. It is now consistent with the aims of the South Vietnamese Government, the desire of the peasantry, the position of the landlords, and the goal of this Nation to end our military involvement in South Vietnam as quickly as possible. The reasons for this will be explored in the next section of my remarks.

In summary, land reform is the single most important nonmilitary activity of a developing nation faced with a revolutionary threat. The success of the land reform effort will determine whether or not the peasants become a force for political stability or a force for revolution—and the peasantry is generally the most crucial force in determining the future of a modernizing nation. Leaders of modernizing nations, as well as their revolutionary opponents, have generally recognized the importance of land reform, but few governments have been able to finance such reform through their own revenues, and fewer still have been able to induce the landowning classes to accept land reform in the absence of adequate compensation. Foreign assistance, whether through military occupation or financial aid, has been the single most effective agent for the implementation of land reform, short of revolution. Such land reform has been

instrumental in bringing political stability to otherwise unstable societies. Land reform made possible by foreign assistance or by non-Communist revolution has been a form of “preventive medicine” for revolution—cheaper by far than subsequent attempts to “cure” revolution by military means. In short, land reform determines, in Huntington's words, whether the peasants will be the bulwark of the status quo or the shock troops of revolution.

III. LAND REFORM IN SOUTH VIETNAM: PAST AND PRESENT

I recognize that for many people it is a long step between supporting land reform in principle and supporting land reform in South Vietnam, particularly land reform that is to be partially financed with American funds. I would be the first to admit that the major impact of land reform in South Vietnam would have been 10 years ago, if it had been carried out at that time, rather than today, when the conflict is advanced.

There remain many reasons why the United States should help implement such reform today, however. Later on in my remarks, I will point out that by so doing, we not only will not prolong our military involvement in South Vietnam, but instead may hasten our departure and reduce our casualties substantially. And the price of land reform in Vietnam, will be less than the price paid by the United States in two days of combat.

Circumstances are now such that the only remaining obstacle to successful land reform in South Vietnam is the potential lack of capital on the part of the government there, and all relevant parties—the peasantry, the landowners, the government of South Vietnam, and American AID officials—are prepared to implement a sound program, already passed into law, as funds are made available.

The peasants of South Vietnam have a proverb that is filled with meaning for the situation today:

He should own the land who rubs it each season between his hands.

This centuries' old feeling helps explain why the peasantry has always been the key element of the indigenous anti-government forces in South Vietnam—since historically the land has not been owned by those who till it, and since the government of South Vietnam in the past has made no effort to redress this wrong the peasants feel.

In two areas of Vietnam where the Vietcong are particularly strong—the Mekong Delta and the Central Lowlands—statistics demonstrate vividly the basis of peasant discontent. In its percentage of landlessness, the Mekong Delta is one of the five worst areas in the world: 73 percent of the peasants are substantially dependent on tenant farming. They pay, on the average, 34 percent of their income in rent to the landlord, who provides few or no inputs. They exist on the land without any assurance that they will be “allowed” to remain on the land the following year. If the crop should fail, the rent is still due. Virtually no disposable surplus remains of the crop, even in years of bumper harvests, after the landlord has been

paid. Conditions in the Central Lowlands, where rents may exceed 50 percent of the crop, are no better. Because of these and similar conditions, the Vietnamese peasants in the Stanford Research Institute field survey named land ownership five times more often than physical security as a matter of chief concern to them.

Despite these incendiary conditions, until recently neither the Government of South Vietnam nor USAID officials have undertaken serious attempts to bring land reform to South Vietnam. The contrast with the Communists could not be more vivid. As Robert Sansom wrote:

The Americans offered the peasant a constitution; the Viet Cong offered him his land and with it, the right to survive.

The result, of course, has been that native guerrillas have always made up a huge percentage of the forces working for the overthrow of the South Vietnamese Government.

The Vietcong, like the Vietminh before them, have skillfully manipulated the peasantry by promising and carrying out land reform in those areas under VC control. The peasantry, in return, have supplied the bulk of the Vietcong fighting force, and have actively aided the Vietcong by providing and caching supplies. These same peasant guerrillas have been responsible for the laying of mines and boobytraps that have resulted in more than half of the American casualties since the Tet offensive. These casualties, of course, have been greatly increased because peasants hostile to the American and ARVN forces have failed to warn our troops as they entered areas in which the land mines and boobytraps were placed.

The Communists seized the initiative in the battle for the peasant's allegiance soon after World War II. The Vietminh carried out land reform on a massive basis at a time when they controlled 60 to 90 percent of South Vietnam. In the North, the Vietminh land reforms were cruelly and brutally reversed in the collectivization process than began after North Vietnam was constituted in 1954. In the south, however, the peasants in Vietminh territory were allowed to hold on to their lands—until the Diem government of South Vietnam began to reassert control. As Diem's troops regained province after province from the Vietminh, the landlords were restored to power and the peasantry resubjugated to the yoke of tenancy that the Communists had lifted from them years earlier.

For this reason, the Communists have remained identified in the south as the agents of land reform, while the government has long been known as the authority responsible for keeping the landlords in power. With the government enforcing the rural status quo, and with the Communists promising—and delivering—land to the peasants, it is no great wonder that the peasants have harbored, aided, and fought on behalf of the Vietcong.

Although President Diem and President Eisenhower initially make token statements about the importance of land reform, both Saigon and the American command lapsed into the belief that this

was a more or less traditional military struggle to be settled by traditional military means; the fallacy of this approach has been amply demonstrated by the elusiveness of that "light at the end of the tunnel." When "pacification" has meant landlords following triumphant American troops back into villages "liberated" from Vietcong control, it is no wonder that the pacification program has not realized our expectations for it.

The first real indication that Saigon had become aware of the importance of land reform did not come until January of 1968. At that time, President Thieu undertook a massive land reform effort to win back the support of the peasantry. Former French lands, held by Diem in the immediate past, were distributed to the peasants at an impressive rate. The following table demonstrates the dramatic progress made by this program, once it was aggressively undertaken:

Land distribution in South Vietnam: 1968-69
[Acres distributed]

January-June 1968.....	20,000
July-December 1968.....	40,000
January-August 1969.....	90,000
September-December 1969.....	90,000

Not only did Thieu distribute the former French lands, but he decreed that landlords should no longer be restored in areas that came under the control of ARVN forces. To insure that landlords whose properties had already been restored did not evict tenants in anticipation of future land reforms, Thieu also decreed an occupancy "freeze" to keep all tenants on the land he hoped—and still hopes—to give to them. Although there were some reversals in this program, by late 1969 it was obvious that Thieu intended to make good on his new-found pledge to give the lands to the peasantry and to win their support for the struggle against the Vietcong.

The most significant among these many significant changes of attitude in Saigon was the passage, in March of this year, of a sweeping land reform program. President Thieu personally rallied support in the National Assembly of South Vietnam, and the result, as I stated at the outset, was one of the most dramatic and thorough land reform programs of the twentieth century. This plan, if fully implemented, will put ownership of all land directly into the hands of the peasants tilling it, at no cost whatsoever to the peasant. The "land to the tiller" program can be substantially implemented within the coming year and in time for the next harvest, if financial support from the United States is forthcoming.

Because of the importance of this "land to the tiller" program, and because rapid implementation of the program will be the goal of all Senators interested in this program, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the Record a description of the various titles of this act, prepared by Prof. Roy Prosterman of the University of Washington Law School. A review of these sections will allow the Members of the Senate to familiarize themselves with the sections of the "land to the tiller" program, and to see that it is a practical plan with promise of being highly effective.

There being no objection, the review was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SECTION REVIEW

Articles 1 and 2 establish the operating principles, including an initial recognition of the priority, as beneficiaries, of "those people actually cultivating"; the intent to affect, without any limitation by way of retained acreage, "lands which are not directly cultivated by landowners"; the resolution to "(e)liminate tenancy" which, like the actual-cultivator and zero-retention principles, underlines the universal application of the program to both secure and insecure areas; the principle of "distribution free of charge" and that of "fair compensation" to landlords; and the inclusion of "communal ricelands" further underlining the universality of the distribution.

Article 3 confirms that not only "riceland" but also "secondary cropland" will be affected. The exclusions in Article 5 make it clear that this means substantially all land not used for industrial crops or orchards. Again, Article 3 underlines that both public and private lands are affected.

Article 4 takes care of some of the administrative problems experienced under the Diem law, notably by requiring that a transfer to be given effect must be registered (not just dated in the parties' own documentation) "prior to the promulgation date of this law." This becomes most important in conjunction with the exclusion from the law, in Article 5, of up to 5 hectares per family of "ancestral worship land." While there is some ambiguity, the intent of the drafters was pretty clearly to exclude from consideration any "ancestral worship" land not registered as such prior to March 26, 1970. Otherwise, a vast administrative snarl would open up as landlords pushed fraudulent claims for exemption of five hectares. (Paced with such a snarl under the 15 hectare "ancestor worship" lands exemption in Diem's Ordinance 57, which did not require a previously registered claim, the administrators ultimately decided that all claims would be allowed across-the-board, effectively increasing the 100 hectare retention limit to 115 hectares.)

The other significant exemptions of Article 5 are lands "presently directly cultivated by landowners" (and under the occupancy-freeze decree, there should have been no change in who "presently" cultivates since April 1969), up to a maximum of 15 hectares, and religious-organization-owned lands, a minor concession economically but a major one in Thieu's effort to get the Vietnamese senate to approve the bill.

Article 6 sets the principle that changes in use will not suffice to invoke the Article 5 exemptions.

Articles 7 through 11 establish the principles of landlord compensation, basic provision to be for compensation at 2½ times the annual paddy yield, paid 20% in cash and 80% in bonds maturing over eight years and bearing 10% interest. (In the legislative process the bonds were deprived of an inflation-proofing feature, but given a higher interest rate.) Bonds are transferrable, but will probably be sharply discounted at least until significant U.S. funding support has been voted.

Article 12 introduces 3 hectare and 1-hectare limits on the amounts of land that can be received by families in the Delta and Central Lowlands, respectively. This is a reduction from 5 and 3 hectare limits in Thieu's original bill, and would pose a massive administrative problem if literally enforced (since administrators would then have to measure, and change the size and shape, of many presently occupied tracts). But the miserable state of the cadastral records allows indulging the present presumption—in the absence of a new, uniform and thorough cadastral survey, which must come years in

the future, if at all—that all tracts are in fact less than the limits: To use such a simplifying presumption is well within the parameters for administering Vietnamese land laws, and use of the presumption or something like it is essential to the overriding purpose of the legislation. It appears that something close to this will in fact be done.

Article 13 underlines that the "present tiller" is number one in order of priority. There may be occasional departures from this at village level, but any departures that were sure to happen probably happened as soon as a given village was administratively reoccupied by daylight, and the guidelines from Saigon should be firm on the legislative standard. (Incidentally, it is the general consensus that there are very few soldiers who have been totally separated from their former lands. Most already occupy land through proxies in the immediate family, so that someone already is on the land to make their claim under the "present tiller" category.)

Article 14 cuts off all taxes on the recipients, including property tax during the first year. The purpose of this was to give the new owners the simplest possible message: you don't pay anything to anybody.

Article 15 tracks other nations' land-reform laws in providing for direct cultivation and a ban on transfer (for 15 years) by the new owners. Article 16 confirms existing decrees in ending payment on former French and Ordinance 57 lands.

Articles 17 through 20 set a credible scale of penalties, including fines up to 200,000 piastres for landlords' efforts to interfere with implementation, and a special penalty of expropriation wholly without compensation for any landlord who makes a false claim of self-cultivation to attempt to invoke Article 5.

Article 21 provides broad power to regulate implementation by decree, and Article 22 cancels all contrary provisions of law.

After concluding this analysis of the "Land to the Tiller" program, Professor Prosterman noted:

Considering the pressures against a viable bill which came from many quarters in the legislature (including both the landlord-related interests and politicians who feared the program would give too broad a base of popular support to President Thieu), the result is a remarkable tribute to Thieu's persistence and to the strength of his recognition of just how important this program can be to the survival of a non-communist Vietnamese government.

The bipartisan group in the Senate that has urged greater American assistance for this program shares a similar recognition of just how important this program can be. Flexibility will be provided both to our Government and to the South Vietnamese in settling upon an effective payment mechanism.

The details of the payment mechanism will be discussed at a later date. The aim of my remarks in this section has been to demonstrate that, whatever our views of the present government in Saigon, land reform is a worthwhile program that American assistance can make possible—and the price of that assistance is almost insignificant in comparison with the price of continued combat. Land reform is obviously in the best interests of the peasantry of South Vietnam, regardless of the fate of the South Vietnamese government. Land reform is also in the best interests of the United States, which seeks to end its involvement in South Vietnam and at the same time provide for some small measure of stability in

that war-torn nation following the departure of American troops.

V. WILL LAND REFORM IN SOUTH VIETNAM PROLONG AMERICAN TROOP INVOLVEMENT?

It is entirely conceivable that someone who understands the importance of land reform in modernizing countries, and who recognizes the potential for land reform in South Vietnam, still might oppose American assistance to implement this plan. Such a position is commonly advanced by those who fear that land reform in South Vietnam will prolong American involvement there and delay the date when all American troops can be brought home safely.

Let me state flatly that if I believed land reform would in fact prolong or deepen our involvement in Vietnam, I would oppose it. I would like to see all of our men home as quickly as possible. The facts simply do not bear out the contention that land reform will cause any delay in American troop withdrawal, however, even under the terms of the most ambitious plans.

The land in South Vietnam can be given to the peasantry before next summer, and in fact should be carried out by this winter for maximum effectiveness. Admittedly, registration of the lands given to the peasants will take a bit longer, but neither this nor the transfer of the land to the peasants requires the presence of American troops. Not only would successful implementation of this plan not delay the departure of American troops, but it could cut our casualties from land mines and boobytraps, and even reduce dramatically the recruitment ability of the troops we have been fighting. The Vietcong obviously fear this, and they have undertaken a major campaign to try to persuade the expectant villagers that the land reform plan will not be carried out as promised.

There are several reasons why the land reform program will not delay our withdrawal.

First, American troops will not be needed in order to implement it—this can be performed by Saigon officials in concert with the USAID mission in Saigon.

Second, the upcoming harvest season is from December to March. It is during this period that the peasants, who now anticipate receiving their land from the government, should have their desires realized. American financial assistance on the order of \$100 million—to be paid only as the program is implemented, and not all at once—can make possible successful land reform for the majority of peasants within areas of ARVN and American control.

Third, the result of these reforms should be a reduction in the Vietcong recruitment rate, and a corollary increase in the support and loyalty that ARVN troops can command in the countryside. Reform is essential if the Vietnamese are ever really to bear the burden of maintaining the independence and stability of their own nation.

Fourth, as I mentioned earlier, more than half our casualties since the spring of 1968 have come from such essentially local activities as the placement of mines and booby traps. Land reform, by

winning the support of the peasants, will cut down on peasant participation in such activities and increase ARVN and American knowledge of where traps have been laid; this will reduce the deaths and maimings that such traps have produced in tragic numbers.

For all of these reasons, then, those who want to increase dramatically the rate of American troop withdrawal—and I am one—will find that land reform is in concert with this objective. Those who favor a more gradual timetable will find that land reform improves the "Vietnamization" program and leads to reduced American casualties. Land reform, then, is one program that everyone can agree upon, if we discard the fears and misconceptions that surround this vital program.

VI. IS LAND REFORM "IMPERIALISTIC"?

It seems appropriate to close by looking at land reform from the perspective of American foreign policy as a whole. Our young people today, and many millions of their elders, are justly concerned about America "imposing" her will and her ideas about "democracy" on the peoples of the world. These critics have argued—none more ardently than the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright) in his book—that America should not seek to make over the rest of the world in her own image. From this general position, many specific criticisms of our actions in Vietnam may be drawn.

To this I can only respond that I am no great admirer of the Thieu-Ky government or its domestic policies—I have recently written President Thieu to express my strong objections to the "tiger cages" of Con Son Island and other violations of personal and political liberty. Yet land reform is not meant primarily to benefit Thieu and Ky—it is meant to benefit the peasantry of South Vietnam, the people on whose behalf we undertook this costly war.

These people make up 60 percent of the population of South Vietnam, and they want land reform. The landlords are willing to accept land reform under the conditions of the "land to the tiller" program. Even the enemies of the Government have promised land reform, although we have ample reason to believe the promise is a deceitful one.

In short, land reform is truly desired by the people of South Vietnam—there can be no doubt about that—and in helping to implement land reform, the United States is not "imposing" any unwanted social reform on the people of South Vietnam. To help a nation fulfill domestic policies demonstrably favored by virtually all elements of that nation's population is not imperialistic, but rather a responsible form of international assistance.

I will go one step further and suggest that helping implement land reform is the type of activity that the United States should engage in throughout the world. We cannot and should not be the "world's policeman," but we can and we must be a constructive force in the world community of nations. Every student of the developing nations knows that they will not develop without substantial assistance from the industrialized nations. The

leaders of the developing nations recognize this, too. The issue America faces in the latter portion of this century is not whether we should have a role in international affairs, but rather what form that role should take.

In the past, the major "assistance" the United States has provided has come in the form of warfare and military aid. If the tragedy of Vietnam has taught us anything—and I pray that it has—it is that an over-reliance on military "solutions" is an inadequate substitute for aiding a nation in making the economic, social, and political reforms that will enable it to make the transition to modernity. This transition may not be peaceful—although we can always work and hope for peaceful change. But the transition may not take place at all, either peacefully or with localized disruption, if the United States and the other industrialized nations abdicate the role of cooperative assistance.

The United States must not react to the Vietnam morass by abandoning its efforts to be of assistance to the nations of the Third World. We cannot remain aloof from the problems, the deprivation, or the aspirations of these people. Our foreign policy must attempt to find non-military means to assist these nations, preferably in concert with other members of the international community. By looking ahead, by dealing with the causes of violence rather than the symptoms, we can make our foreign policy more responsible. Land reform—not alone in South Vietnam, but in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World—can be a useful, appropriate, relatively inexpensive, and nondestructive method of assisting the modernizing nations.

Finally, and most importantly, unless we broaden our conception of foreign policy to include land reform, we may risk more Vietnams in the years to come. The consequences of such continued ignorance and intransigence will therefore be the same as the consequences, both international and domestic, of this hateful war. Our Nation, and the nations of the world, cannot afford such a perilous future. The first step toward avoiding other Vietnams, belated as this step may be, is land reform in South Vietnam. I earnestly hope that the Senate will recognize this fact, and act swiftly to make the "land to the tiller" program a success.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I support the statement of the distinguished senior Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) concerning land reform in South Vietnam.

I am a strong support of the South Vietnamese land of the tiller program. For the past decade and a half, a number of Americans, beginning with the late President Eisenhower, have spoken of the need for such a program.

The land of the tiller program is designed to transfer the ownership of approximately 2½ to 3 million acres of land to some 1 million tenant and refugee families. I am convinced that this will give the tenant farmers—who comprise one-third of the total population of South Vietnam—a lasting stake in their Government.

But this program must be speedily implemented. By giving the peasants a stake in the preservation of their country, rapid implementation of land reform offers the possibility of a significant shift in peasant allegiance toward the Central Government.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article I wrote last year for the Ripon Society Forum, outlining the urgent need for land reform not only in South Vietnam, but in other quarters of the world.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

LAND REFORM: THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION

Over the past 60 years, four great civil wars have erupted and claimed over a million lives apiece—in Mexico, beginning in 1910; in Russia, starting in 1917; in China, beginning in the 1920's; and in Vietnam starting in 1945—with an even more virulent phase beginning about 1960. Each of these was essentially a peasant revolt.

The Mexican Revolution was reformist but largely nonideological, and it created one of Latin America's most politically stable and economically progressive regimes. The other three uprisings occurred under Communist banners, and brought into play successively greater degrees of American involvement—culminating in the tragedy of Vietnam, which has thus far cost nearly 40,000 American lives and more than 100 billion American dollars.

But for all our knowledge about these peasant revolutions, we have not fully understood what has happened and why. And I fear that until we do, we are doomed to repeat our Vietnam experience again and again.

RURAL REVOLT

Let us first be sure that we understand the largely agrarian nature of these revolutions:

Mexico, in 1910, was two-thirds rural, with 95 percent of its rural population living as landless peons or as sharecroppers. The spark of revolution came after the Indians' last remaining lands had been seized by speculators, when a presidential candidate offered to give back the land. Zapata accepted the offer.

Russia, in 1917, was 80 percent rural. Roughly three out of every five rural families were landless. And, though Karl Marx had written in the *Communist Manifesto* of the "idioty of rural life," one of Lenin's two great decrees in the first week of the October Revolution vested immediate ownership of all land in those who actually tilled it. Without the peasants' support of the revolution the ensuing civil war would have had a different result.

China, beginning in 1927, was the scene of Mao's explicit break with the Marxist concept of revolution based on the urban industrial proletariat, and of his effort to fashion a peasant revolt. With an 80 percent rural population, three-quarters of which was landless, China was ripe for revolution. Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to fight Mao's land reform with military hardware lost a nation of half a billion people in two decades.

Vietnam, from 1945 on, saw an application of much the same tactics that had succeeded in China. In the Viet Minh stage, the promise of land-to-the-tiller was effectively tied to a nationalist revolution. Here again, 80 percent of the population was rural, and the bulk of that segment was substantially landless (tenant farming accounted for around 50 percent in the central and northern reaches, and for nearly 75 percent in the populous Mekong Delta). The prognosis for revolution was again excellent.

A DOZEN VIETNAMS

Today there are dozens of Mexicos and Russias and Chinas and Vietnams in the

making. Three-fifths of the total population of the developing nations is rural, and a staggering percentage of these people are landless laborers or tenant farmers. In places like Vietnam, these farmers may pay one-third to one-half of their tiny crop in rent every year to an absentee landlord. In return, they are granted no security or tenure whatever. Or, if their situation is like that of laborers on Latin American plantations, they may make \$15.00 a month to feed and clothe a whole family.

These discontented peasants are searching for a better life—and wherever the Communists offer it, they rush to the Communist banner.

A paradox arises, however, when one considers further our four great revolutions. The Mexicans kept their promise; they redistributed half the crop land in the country, so that 75 percent of the rural families now own their own land. The pleased peasants not only have refrained from overthrowing a Mexican government for half a century, but they have also more than tripled their agricultural production since the 1930's; and their higher incomes have fueled the growth of urban industry to supply consumer goods and agricultural inputs. A similar promise was made and kept in Bolivia—with less bloodshed—and made and kept without any revolution at all in Japan, Taiwan (ten years too late), South Korea, and Iran. Such a promise has recently been made in Peru.

UNKEPT PROMISES

But the Russians, Chinese, and North Vietnamese didn't keep their promises; once the revolution had succeeded, they launched into a second stage of "land reform," which involved the collectivization of holdings under the state as a kind of super-landlord. The Russian "land reform" killed or deported millions; the Chinese killed 800,000 or more; the North Vietnamese, 50,000 to 100,000. This was the "land reform" path also followed by the Cubans.

And the peasants' unhappiness with the arrangements in these countries could be detected in their drastically reduced productivity. Russia took until 1953 to return to its 1928 (pre-collectivization) level of agricultural production. China is about even now. Taiwan, by contrast, has doubled its rice production since the land-to-the-family-farmer reform has begun. Cuba is still behind the pre-Castro level.

Thus, we have a rather strange set of facts:

1. Mexico, Japan and other countries have carried out massive land reform basically on the family-farm pattern and have reaped the twin benefits of long-term political stability and a sustained increase in production.

2. Russia, North Vietnam, and other countries that have ruthlessly collectivized the land have secured a consistently miserable production record from their sullen peasants.

3. Nonetheless, those who call themselves Communists have been able in much of the developing world—including Vietnam and Latin America—to hold themselves out as the genuine agrarian reformers.

AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE

The problem, it seems to me, is that the United States has not effectively offered an alternative; and until we do, we will be faced with a continuous series of Vietnam-type crises built on peasant unrest around the world.

Our alternative is land reform—broad land reform, with fair compensation to the landowners, that gives the great mass of peasants a stake in their society and an incentive to produce. Land reform eradicates the key appeal that has been used in starting "wars of national liberation"; and it can "revolution-proof" the developing world against such enticements, as it has most notably done for the Bolivian peasant against the call of Che Guevara and for the South Ko-

rean peasant against the efforts of the North to start a behind-the-lines "people's war."

There is no sounder, higher-priority use of our foreign aid dollar than in the reform of land tenure. We must think in terms of four related ideas in order to use that land reform dollar most effectively and with maximum leverage:

1. *Information.* We are woefully short of detailed data on the land-reform problem around the world. Too many political officers in overseas embassies send back their assessments of rural unrest based on what they have heard at English-speaking, urban cocktail parties—instead of on what they have observed while bounding along back roads in a jeep.

In Latin America, a preliminary assessment based on non-government scholarship indicates that countries on the "critical list," as prime candidates for peasant-based revolutions over the next decade or so, include Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and most of Central America. In Asia, the list includes the Philippines, Indochina, India, Pakistan, and Nepal. Systematic gathering of comparative data on tenancy, agricultural labor, land values, credit needs, and related matters in these and other developing countries should be initiated at once.

2. *Compensation.* In most nations, politically viable, non-revolutionary land reform programs must first assuage the landlords' doubts that the bonds they receive for their property will ever be paid off. To resolve these doubts, a central element in our land-reform strategy should be the creation of a multilateral agency to act as guarantor of land reform bonds issued by individual countries. Under such a plan, the U.S. could pledge one dollar to the capital of such an agency for every dollar (or two dollars) put up by other developed countries and for corresponding, though lesser, amounts put up by the developing nation.

E.G., NORTHEAST BRAZIL

Brazil, for example, badly needs a land reform program in its teeming Northeast, where 70 percent of the 30 million population is rural and 70 percent of that element is landless. According to a preliminary estimate, it would cost about \$1 billion to carry out such a program over a period of seven to ten years. If the Brazilians wanted help—and most of the nations in Brazil's position are desperate to find a way out consistent with not bringing their governments crashing down—they would enter into an agreement with the insuring fund. For an approved plan (one giving the bulk of its benefits to the landless tenant and plantation worker), the fund would guarantee the principal and interest of the land reform bonds to be issued.

The chief source of bond retirement would be a sinking fund established under agreed-upon rules, into which the peasants would make payments for their land over a period of perhaps 15 years. Meanwhile, the original landowners would know that the international community stood behind the bonds (which, however, they would be allowed and encouraged to transform into needed non-inflationary capital goods from the start).

Very preliminary calculations suggest that \$1 billion of land reform in Brazil could be bought at a net outlay by the U.S.—through the international fund—of only \$100 to \$200 million. For the above-named "critical" countries as a group, preliminary data suggest that land reform with a gross cost of some \$6 to \$8 billion would likely "revolution-proof" most of the developing world for the next couple of decades, and that the net cost to the U.S.—through the fund—would probably be less than \$2 billion, or what it costs us to fight in Vietnam for a month.

3. *Credit.* The fund should also be a vehicle for credit and supporting services to the smallest farmers. Too much U.S. agriculture credit assistance—including that for

the "miracle" rice and wheat programs—appears to be going to the solid, traditionally creditworthy farmer, and not to be benefiting the masses of rural poor in any way. (Even if more rice is produced, they still can't afford to buy it.) Credit might be generated partly by fund guarantees to commercial banks, and partly by direct establishment of a revolving fund to be replenished by peasant repayments. For the "critical" countries, this package of supporting services might come to a further \$3 to \$4 billion with a net U.S. outlay of less than \$1 billion.

4. *Bilateral aid.* In a few spots, notably Vietnam, our support for land reform will have to be quick and bilateral. The failure to carry out land reform sooner is perhaps the greatest tragedy of the whole Vietnam involvement. Fortunately, the Vietnamese at least seem to be moving strongly on a radically simplified, sweeping land reform program, with a total cost of \$400 to \$500 million (no peasant repayment, since we are competing with a purportedly "free" Viet Cong program). The U.S. should bear as much of this as needed—the whole amount is a week's cost of the war—to keep the program moving fast.

AVOIDING NEW TRAGEDIES

In certain proximate countries, like Panama or the Dominican Republic, a few tens of millions for land reform now may help avoid tragedy in the 1970's; and strategic considerations may suggest immediate bilateral assistance.

In summary, with the right priorities and with imaginative programs, and at a total cost of perhaps \$3 billion spread over a decade or more, the U.S. can become the "champion" of land reform; help bring about markedly increased political stability in the developing world; and help motivate a marked increase in agricultural production.

For a tiny fraction of what it has cost us in Vietnam, the United States can buy insurance against future Vietnams, and can bring a higher standard of living and a more meaningful existence to millions of people whose lives are now more reminiscent of the Middle Ages than the 20th Century.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD a statement prepared by the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) and the article entitled, "Real Land Reform Comes to Vietnam," as requested by Senator MUSKIE.

There being no objection, the Statement and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REAL LAND REFORM COMES TO VIETNAM

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, during the past year I have spoken several times on the great importance of United States support for a comprehensive program of land reform in South Vietnam. I join today with Senators Magnuson and Packwood in reemphasizing the broad implications which such a program can have for termination of the conflict in Vietnam.

It is clear that whatever policy the United States pursues in disengaging from this war, an increasing burden and responsibility must fall upon the South Vietnamese themselves. It is also clear that this responsibility must include broadening the base of support for the central government, whoever may be at the head of that government.

The fighting and killing in Vietnam can never be brought to an end without a political settlement of some sort. That settlement must necessarily be based on winning the support of the Vietnamese peasant. Who today has little stake in the future of his country.

A successful land reform program offers a unique possibility for winning this support. It could provide the incentive neces-

sary to stabilize the political situation in South Vietnam. As Senator Magnuson and Senator Packwood have pointed out in their remarks, the promise of land tenure has been a key weapon in revolutionary movements during this century. Vietnam is no exception.

In the August 9 edition of the Baltimore Sun there was an article on land reform by Professor Roy Prosterman, who has been very influential in the development of the land to the Tiller Bill signed into law in March, 1970, by President Thieu. Professor Prosterman has provided a thoughtful and concise analysis of the historical background leading up to the present program of land reform, which President Thieu initiated. In commenting on the significance of this program and the failure of the Diem regime to carry out land reform in the 1950's, Professor Prosterman states that, "indeed, if the Communists had been deprived of their chief selling point in the South Vietnamese countryside through effective land reform, it is probably true that there never would have been a war."

Turning to the possible impact of a successful land reform effort, Professor Prosterman further states that for the first time, Saigon has the opportunity to "come to grips with the focal issue in the countryside, the one that has supplied the chief Viet Cong appeal to the peasantry."

I urge my colleagues to consider the arguments presented in this article. Land reform in Vietnam is long overdue. The United States must provide its full encouragement and support for implementation of this program as rapidly as possible, if the impact of land reform is to be fully realized.

REAL LAND REFORM COMES TO VIETNAM

(By Roy L. Prosterman)

An editorial in a major daily in late March called the new South Vietnamese land reform law "the most important news to come out of Vietnam since the end of the Japanese occupation." They may not have exaggerated.

Lack of landownership among the peasantry formed a basic part of the Communist appeal in Russia, China and Cuba, so it should be no surprise that it has performed a parallel function in Vietnam in the hands both of the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong.

Tenant farming is the biggest occupation in South Vietnam, with close to a million Vietnamese families, or about 6 million people in a population of 17 million, dependent on it. The Mekong Delta, where about 70 percent of the farm families are primarily dependent on farming tenanted land, has one of the highest proportions of tenant farmers in the world. The typical delta family lives on 3½ acres, pays a third of its crop to the landlord (who supplies no inputs of any description), rarely has any surplus beyond its immediate nutritional needs, is evictable at will and is held for the rent even in the case of crop failure. In Central Vietnam, the typical tract is 2 acres and the rent averages half the crop.

For years the Viet Minh and then the Viet Cong were allowed to hold themselves out to these people as land reformers, who would drive away their landlords and give them their land, while the successive Saigon governments were identified as pro-landlord.

DIEM'S DISASTER

In retrospect, the most disastrous of all Ngo Dinh Diem's policies in the late 1950's was probably that which promoted return to the landlords of the extensive lands purportedly distributed by the Viet Minh to the peasantry in the 1945-1954 period and reassertion of the landlords' traditional rights over their former tenants. The promotion of this worse-than-useless program—with the co-operation of American advisers who were unwilling to push for the major land reform that our top

policy-makers wanted—was surely one of the pre-eminent disasters of postwar American foreign aid.

Diem's failure to act was doubly tragic because the Communists in the North were carrying out their usual second-stage land reform—collectivization, as in Russia, China and later Cuba—which defeated most of the expectations that had lead peasants to support the revolution. As elsewhere, collectivization was violent, unpopular and disastrous for production.

Diem might have looked, as an alternative for the South, toward any of the massive democratic land reforms that had already been carried out in the Twentieth Century in Mexico, Bolivia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But Diem failed to profit by example. He stood with the landlords and we stood with Diem and as we moved into the 1960's the revived Communist movement was once more offering land to a population whose entire security and livelihood were bound up with their relation to the soil.

Little wonder that the common recruiting appeal in wide areas where Viet Cong land reform was in effect was "the movement has given you land, give us your son," as it was put by Marine Lt. Col. William Corson in "The Betrayal."

Or that the late Bernard Fall called land reform "as essential to success as ammunition for howitzers—in fact, more so."

Or that Douglas Pike, probably our leading authority on the Viet Cong, describes their indoctrination system as "based on vested interests in land."

Or that field interviewers in a 1967 Stanford Research Institute study found that Vietnamese tenant farmers named landown-ership five times as frequently as physical security as a thing of crucial concern to them.

Of that over half of those bearing arms against us in Vietnam, main force and guer-rilla units taken together, are still today native South Vietnamese.

Or that over half of all American casualties in the last two years have been due to such essentially local guerrilla activities as planting mines and booby traps—the vil-lagers then standing silent as we walk into them.

Or that virtually no main force activities could take place without the essential advance work done by the local villagers in carrying in and burying supplies and am-munition at intervals along the line of march toward the military objective.

Indeed, if the Communists had been de-prived of their chief selling point in the South Vietnamese countryside through ef-fective land reform, it is probably true that there never would have been a war. Pres-ident Nguyen Van Thieu himself made sub-stantially that observation in a speech given January 18, 1968.

The failure from 1955 well into 1968 to come to grips with this problem is so com-plete and so numbing that one must mental-ly prepare to receive the pleasant shock of the facts from recent months.

Now, at long last, the South Vietnamese government, under strong pressure from President Thieu and with newly firm Amer-ican support, is preparing to offer the peas-ants as much as the Viet Cong have seemed to offer. Much more, in fact, for the Saigon land reform program is not meant to be followed by collectivization. Since coming to grips with the fundamental need for land reform in early 1968, President Thieu has successfully pushed through five critical land reform measures:

FIVE MEASURES

1. At the end of 1968, he ended the in-credible, self-defeating practice by which landlords had been returning to reassert their "rights" to land, often riding into newly secured villages in South Vietnamese Army jeeps.

2. In April, 1969, he put a freeze on all rights to land occupancy, pending passage of new land reform legislation. Preliminary field observations have indicated this freeze to be well-publicized and quite effective.

3. In June, 1969, he began an accelerated distribution of government-owned lands free of charge. Since then, over 300,000 acres have been distributed to the benefit of nearly 100,000 former tenant-farmer families.

4. In July, 1969, he presented the land-to-the-tiller bill to the National Assembly. After a desperate fight against landlord in-terests and political opponents, the bill was passed in March. This measure, which the New York Times has editorially called "prob-ably the most ambitious and progressive non-Communist land reform of the Twentieth Century," is the keystone of Mr. Thieu's ef-forts. It embodies a drastically simplified program which will distribute virtually all tenanted land in the country to the present tillers free of charge and with fair payment by the government to the landlords. Owner-ship of over half the cultivated land in the country will change hands and a million tenant-farmer families—a third of the na-tion's population—will become full owners.

The total price tag of about \$400 million is equivalent to around five days' cost of the war. U.S. support—in the form of productive commodities to generate plasters—for some-where between a quarter and a half this amount will be asked from Congress in the coming months and it is to my mind un-doubtedly the biggest bargain of the Viet-nam War; preliminary measures have already been introduced in both houses with ex-tremely broad bipartisan support.

5. Last June, he further simplified the pro-gram's administration by decreeing an im-mediate end to all rents without formalities, such as Western-style land titles.

A number of factors have combined with the program's enormous simplicity and the major results already achieved to give even the most jaded observers real hope that this package of measures will be largely effective by the next main harvest from December through February.

EXCELLENT PROSPECTS

There are excellent prospects that the great majority of South Vietnam's million tenant-farmer families will be free of rents they would otherwise pay and will regard them-selves as definitely on the road to full owner-ship under policies sponsored by Saigon. Those living in Viet Cong-controlled areas will consider themselves definitely freed from the prospect that Saigon's control means the landlords' return and confirmed in possession of the land they are tilling.

If Saigon can carry it off, what conse-quences can be expected? There would appear to be several, each of potentially far-reaching importance:

For the first time, Saigon will have suc-cessfully come to grips with the focal issue in the countryside, the one that has supplied the chief Viet Cong appeal to the peasantry. A significant spectrum shift in allegiance among Vietnam's 8 million tenant-farmer people can be expected in Saigon's direction.

This shift will have not only a political dimension, but a significant military dimen-sion. Notably, tenant farmers and sons of tenant-farmers, who are the largest rank-and-file group in the South Vietnamese Army and in the local militia, are more likely to be motivated to fight if they have a stake in their society, which is probably of more fun-damental importance to the success of "Viet-namization" than whether the recruit gets an M-16 to replace his M-1. Moreover, peas-ants who regard Saigon as the source of their land-ownership are more likely to take the risk of supplying intelligence. At the same time, the root of peasant motivation to sup-port the Viet Cong in a variety of ways will be significantly weakened.

MIGHT HELP PARIS TALKS

The prospect of such a massive, grassroots shift in peasant support is one of the few things that can be visualized which might supply enough bargaining leverage to get the Paris talks moving again. Indeed, former Paris negotiator Cyrus Vance suggested last fall that the offer to hold back on implemen-tation of the land reform in historically Viet Cong-controlled areas could become a powerful bargaining lever, once the land-to-the-tiller bill had been passed.

Land reform, at last, and tragically late, appears to have come to Vietnam. But even at this date it is, without exaggeration, one of the major events of the war.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. ON MONDAY, AUGUST 24, 1970

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, instead of com-ing in at 11 o'clock on Monday next, the Senate, when it completes its business tonight, stand in adjournment until 10 o'clock on Monday morning next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR PACKWOOD ON MONDAY NEXT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately after the disposition of the Journal and the unobjected to items on the Calendar on Monday next, the distinguished Sen-ator from Oregon (Mr. Packwood) be recognized for not to exceed 1 hour. He in turn will be followed by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS ON MONDAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Monday next, at the conclusion of the remarks of the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright), there be a period for the trans-action of routine morning business, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS, 1971

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending business be laid aside temporarily and that the Senate proceed to the consid-eration of Calendar No. 1129, H.R. 18127 and that it be laid down and made the pending business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Spone). The bill will be stated by title. The legislative clerk read as follows:

H.R. 18127, an act making appropriations for public works for water, pollution control, and power development, including the Corps of Engineers—Civil, the Panama Canal, the Federal Water Quality Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation, power agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Tennes-see Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy Commission, and related independent agen-